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Russian Federation: Executive Branch 
By Susan Cavan 
 
Transition 
Perhaps the most remarkable event of the past month was not that President 
Boris Yel'tsin used a constitutionally enshrined process to resign his office early 
and ensure the most favorable electoral conditions for his chosen successor, but 
rather that several insiders knew of his plans in advance and didn't leak the 
news. For once in the Yel'tsin presidency it seems vital negotiations on political 
succession and personnel changes were held close to the vest. In sharp contrast 
to last year's blatant horse-trading, mediated by the Primakov government, the 
resignation-for-immunity deal struck between Yel'tsin and Vladimir Putin was 
quick and quiet. While the full details, especially regarding the larger Family, are 
yet unclear, the basic outline is known and accepted both at home and abroad. 
Yel'tsin has full immunity from prosecution and Putin has fast elections at a time 
when his popularity is high and under circumstances that will make it difficult for a 
rival to mount an effective challenge. 
 
Leaving to another time the consideration of Yel'tsin's legacy, the analysis and 
projection of a Putin presidency takes on a sense of urgency. The now standard 
view of Putin's background as somehow politically unclear because of his dual 
tracks as career KGB agent and St. Petersburg Mayor Anatoli Sobchak-allied 
reformer is misleading, primarily because of the misuse of the term "reformer." It 
was not unusual in the late Soviet period for KGB officers, especially those 
stationed in the West (as was Putin), to recognize the need for reform to the 
Soviet system. That does not suggest, however, that their view of reform would 
have been palatable to the West. Even the more economically liberal reform 
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ideas of Sobchak were blended with a strong sense of Russian nationalism, a 
fact often overlooked by Western analysts. 
 
In any event, acting President Putin has quickly established a record as chief 
executive that may provide insight into the contours of his political views. Clearly, 
Putin's first priority is securing electoral victory in March. That priority colors 
many of the steps he has already taken, and is evidenced by his characterization 
of personnel reshuffles as "temporary." (ITAR-TASS, 1312 GMT, 10 Jan 00; 
FBIS-SOV-2000-0110, via World News Connection)  
 
The changes to the Kremlin staff, including the dismissal of Tatiana Dyachenko 
and Pavel Borodin, demonstrate a move to distance himself, at least publicly, 
from the much-maligned "Family," but the retention of Aleksandr Voloshin and 
the soft landing for Borodin, who is slated for a new job in the Belarus-Russian 
State Council, suggest that the Family will not be far removed from the decision-
making process. (KOMSOMOL'SKAYA PRAVDA, 12 Jan 00; Russian Press 
Digest, via lexis-nexis) 
 
The changes made in the government could reflect a slight shift in alliance with 
Boris Berezovsky, which may prove dangerous if Berezovsky feels provoked and 
decides to lash out through his media outlets. First Deputy prime minister Mikhail 
Kasayanov, rumored to be Berezovsky's candidate for prime minister in the 
Primakov-Stepashin reshuffle last May, has been demoted to railways minister. 
While he does retain control of a financially powerful ministry, he is now 
significantly removed from the political decision-making. Finance Minister Nikolai 
Kasayanov has been selected as the sole first deputy prime minister, and has 
been designated by Putin as "government coordinator," which would appear to 
mean he will assume the role of acting prime minister, temporarily, without the 
title. (INTERFAX, 1307 GMT, 10 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-1010, via World News 
Connection) 
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Kasayanov, who retains his post at the finance ministry, has claimed that deputy 
Alexei Kudrin (a Chubais ally from St. Petersburg) will serve as de facto finance 
minister. (INTERFAX, 1822 GMT, 11 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0111, via World 
News Connection) The other former first deputy prime minister, Viktor 
Khristenko, has been knocked down to one of several deputy prime ministers. 
Ilya Klebanov has also been named a deputy PM, as well as Emergencies 
Minister Sergei Shoigu, who apparently received the position as a reward for the 
remarkable Duma electoral success. (INTERFAX, 1307 GMT, 10 Jan 00; FBIS-
SOV-2000, via World News Connection) 
 
Another deputy prime minister, Nikolai Koshman, who is also the Russian 
representative to Chechnya, finally addressed the questions raised about 
responsibility for the bombing in Russia last Fall. Denying that the security 
services played a role in the explosions, Koshman claimed that the Basaev-allied 
Commander Khattab "admitted" the bombings "were his work." (ITAR-TASS, 
1151 GMT, 6 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0106, via World News Connection) 
Koshman also claimed to have uncovered a terrorist training camp in Urus-
Martan, where they also discovered explosives like those used in the Moscow 
bombings 
 
Perhaps the most alarming trend in the Putin acting presidency, however, is the 
revitalization of the Security Council and the decision to approve and publicize a 
change in the security concept that would permit the use of nuclear weapons, 
"where all other means to settle the crisis have been exhausted or have proved 
ineffective." (AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE, 1000 PST, 14 Jan 00; via 
afp@clari.net) 
 
A change in nuclear policy would be a delicate international issue at any time, but 
in the middle of Russia's first presidential succession, when the chosen 
successor is so little-known to the world, it seems a particularly dangerous signal 
for Putin to send. Additionally, Putin's focus on security issues was evident from 
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the very start of his assumption of presidential powers, as one of his initial acts 
on 31 December was to chair a meeting of the Security Council. The new 
security concept, approved at the 6 January Security Council session, is reported 
to strengthen substantially the role of the power organs domestically and may 
include the creation of a "super special service." (Attributed to Segodnya in THE 
GUARDIAN, 13 Jan 2000; via Johnson's Russia List) 
 
Putin has made a point to reassure the public that he is firmly committed to 
principles of democracy and a market economy, but his assurances must be 
tempered with an understanding that his actions carry more weight. So far, he 
has intensified the war in Chechnya, heightened the importance of the security 
services and demonstrated a willingness to rely upon several of the same tainted 
insiders who dominated the Yel'tsin regime. So far, these actions bode well for 
neither Russia nor the West, but the period following the elections, when his 
"temporary" changes become more permanent will be far more telling. 
 
 
Russian Federation: Foreign Relations 
By Chandler Rosenberger and Sarah Miller 
 
Reformer or nationalist? Or reformer-nationalist? 
Yel'tsin's surprise resignation on New Year's Eve left a host of questions at the 
bottom of champagne flutes across the globe. What should the West make of 
Vladimir Putin, the ex-spy who had seized Moscow's reins? Had Putin's stint 
spying in Germany convinced him that Russia should adopt Western ways? Or 
had Putin drunk too deeply from the well of Soviet ideology ever to keep his 
country on a reformist course? 
 
Putin's actions in his first two weeks -- especially his acceptance of a "new" 
national security doctrine -- have shown how false this prevailing dichotomy is. 
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Putin, it seems, is both a reformer and an anti-Western nationalist -- a man 
committed to strengthening Russia to give it more weight to throw around. 
 
Looking into Putin's past for clues to his future, US administration officials found 
two dominant and apparently contradictory themes. On the one hand was Putin's 
15 years of service, from 1975 to 1990, as a KGB agent. Putin, according to the 
German weekly Der Spiegel, had earned the East German Army's Bronze Order 
for running spy operations against West German firms. On the other hand was 
Putin's service, following his return to St. Petersburg in 1990, as a deputy mayor 
in the reformist city council -- a government that gave some reformers, including 
Anatoly Chubais, their first taste of power. 
 
"Putin has two strands in his background," National Security Advisor Sandy 
Berger told a panel on ABC's This Week, "and I think we'll have to see which is 
the dominant strand, where his center of gravity is, so to speak." (USA TODAY, 3 
Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
In fact, Putin's past is more black than white. In recalling the new premier's 
career, administration officials neglect to mention that Putin served as head of 
the Federal Security Service, the domestic branch of the former KGB, from 1998 
to 1999. Even in the post-Soviet era, Putin deployed Soviet tactics. He insisted, 
for example, that Aleksandr Nikitin, a retired naval officer turned 
environmentalist, be prosecuted for espionage for an unprecedented eighth time. 
Nikitin's crime? Using open sources to show the Russian Navy's poor 
environmental record. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 27 Sep 99) 
 
This Jekyll-and-Hyde view of Putin, moreover, led the White House and many 
journalists to misread the first signals from Moscow. The possibility that the two 
dispositions -- reformist and nationalist -- fit together in the same character was 
never seriously considered. 
 
 6 
START-II -- Good for me, but good for you? 
Obsessed as it is with arms control regimes, the US administration looked with 
fondness on Putin's promise to push the START-II Treaty through a newly 
amenable Duma. 
 
The White House might have known better. Deputy Secretary of State Strobe 
Talbot had rushed to Moscow a day after the new parliament's election, only to 
find that the Russian government had attached strings to any deal. Even the new 
"reformist" Duma would only pass START II, Talbot found, if the United States 
dropped revisions of the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. (The Jamestown 
Foundation MONITOR, 3 Jan 00) 
 
The Putin government has promised quick ratification of the START-II Treaty, but 
has also kept Russia's interests in mind. Defense Minister Igor Sergeev, for 
example, argued that Washington would have a more difficult time amending the 
ABM Treaty if Russia made such a gesture of goodwill. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 12 
Jan 00) If Moscow agrees to one White House initiative in order to thwart 
another, is this evidence of a pro-Western tilt? 
 
The Security Concept -- (almost) the same as it ever was 
If it was Dr. Jekyll that the White House saw approving its arms control treaty, 
then only Mr. Hyde could have crafted a security doctrine as nefarious as the one 
President Putin signed on 6 January. When the 21-page document was printed a 
week later, correspondents reacted with horror at the discovery that Russia saw 
international relations as a contest with the United States. Worse still, reporters 
found that Moscow had committed itself to reducing the influence of the United 
States abroad, lest a "multipolar world" give way to a "unipolar" order following 
Washington's lead. 
 
"Russia has revised its defense doctrine to make it easier to press the nuclear 
button in an international crisis," The Independent panted, "while unequivocally 
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declaring the west a hostile power that must be resisted." (THE INDEPENDENT, 
14 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) The New York Times concluded that the revised 
language on nuclear weapons, "a subtle but unmistakable stiffening of the 
previous strategy," should be seen as the Kremlin "underscoring its darkening 
view of the West." (THE NEW YORK TIMES, 15 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Is this the bad Putin all have feared, the dark regime following Boris Yel'tsin's 
enlightened reign? The new doctrine, to be sure, is somewhat freer in the use of 
nuclear weapons. Russia may now use them "to repel armed aggression, if all 
other measures for resolving the crisis situation have been exhausted and have 
proved ineffective"; the 1997 version allowed Russia to turn to its atomic arsenal 
only "in case of a threat to the existence of the Russian Federation." (REUTERS, 
2219 GMT, 14 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis, and THE NEW YORK TIMES, 15 Jan 00; 
via lexis-nexis) 
 
The change, however, appears merely to accommodate a Kosovo blowing up in 
Chechnya. If the West were to pummel Russian troops as it had the Serbs, the 
"existence of the Russian Federation" arguably would not be at stake, but Russia 
would nonetheless prefer the freedom to use its nukes. The doctrine's anti-
Western tone, moreover, is not much different from that of the 1997 version, in 
which NATO expansion was alluded to as a threat to Russia's national security, 
and in which Russia reasserted its right to use nuclear weapons in response to a 
non-nuclear attack. (PERSPECTIVE, Jan-Feb 98) 
 
As recently as October 1999, Yel'tsin's Russia reserved the right to use its atomic 
weapons against non-nuclear powers if they were merely allied to nuclear 
countries and attacked a country to which Russia had "security obligations." If 
Turkey attacked Syria, for example, Russia could launch. (KRASNAYA ZVEZDA, 
9 Oct 99; BBC Summary of World Broadcasts, via lexis-nexis) 
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The emphasis on nuclear weapons in both the new and old doctrines, however, 
does cast Moscow's suspicion of ABM Treaty revision in an ominous light. One is 
tempted to ask: Does Russia oppose an American antimissile defense system 
because its prestige in world affairs depends so heavily on its own rockets? And 
if so, has Russia's nuclear policy changed much in the move from Yel'tsin to 
Putin -- or from the breakup of the Soviet Union to the reemergence of Russia? 
 
'Liberating' Grozny 
If Western governments remained puzzled by Putin's nature, Putin must have 
been just as perplexed by his new colleagues on the world stage. Before 
Yel'tsin's exit, Western governments sometimes found the courage to criticize 
Russia's war in Chechnya. None, however, would stand against the new Putin 
regime. Some, such as US President Bill Clinton, came close to endorsing 
Moscow's brutal war. 
 
Who now recalls when the members of the G-7 were willing to criticize their 
Russian guests? At the organization's December meeting, Germany, France and 
Britain were reported to have taken a hard line with Russian Foreign Minister Igor 
Ivanov, and might have endorsed sanctions if the US had not intervened. (The 
Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 20 Dec 99) Since then, however, the rise of 
the "nationalist" Putin appears to have frightened Russia's critics away. German 
Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer, once Moscow's fiercest critic, has assured 
Moscow that Chechnya will play no role in upcoming tripartite talks with Italy. 
(ITAR-TASS, 12 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) 
 
The US administration had never had a noble record of restraining Moscow's 
dark impulses. When the White House finally cancelled a $500 million loan from 
the Export-Import Bank to the Russian oil industry, it meekly assured Moscow 
that corruption, not the wholesale slaughter of Chechens, had forced its hand. 
(DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, 2341 CET, 21 Dec 99, via lexis-nexis) 
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Apparently taken aback by Yel'tsin's sudden resignation, however, the 
administration plumbed new moral depths. Russia might well continue to "liberate 
Grozny," Clinton wrote in a laudatory essay on Yel'tsin in Time magazine; the 
only question was how best to avoid civilian casualties and, later, to ponder 
whether war was the best way to deal with "problems involving separatists and 
terrorists." (TIME, 1 Jan 00) 
 
On the day Clinton's essay was published, Russian forces unleashed an 
exceptionally fierce air attack on the Chechen capital, dropping dozens of bombs 
from low-flying jets. Civilians hiding in the city's basements reported it was the 
worst attack they had seen in three months. (THE ASSOCIATED PRESS, 1 Jan 
00; via lexis-nexis) Did fear of provoking Yel'tsin's mysterious successor prompt 
Clinton to endorse such savagery, and to embrace Russia's definitions of the 
war? Did Clinton fear that, otherwise, a new "nationalist" might emerge in the 
Kremlin and drive the "reformers" from its halls? If so, the White House has 
shown how little it understood its former friend, and how little it understands 
Moscow's new regime. Like Yel'tsin, Putin probably would like to shake off 
Communism but only because it has weakened the Russia he loves. Like 
Yel'tsin, Putin is probably both a reformer and a nationalist, and one just as prone 
to anti-Western words and deeds. 
 
For good or for ill, Putin is probably not that different from his old boss. He's just 
better at the job. Whether that's welcome news for the West remains to be seen. 
 
Dear Japan, Don't hold your breath but please give us money. Thanks, 
Russia. 
Up until the final hours of 1999, the Japanese government remained optimistic 
about relations with Russia. And although the peace treaty and Kurile Islands 
dispute were not resolved by the year 2000, the Japanese ambassador to 
Moscow, Minoru Tamba, hasn't give up hope for resolution of the issues within 
the year. (INTERFAX, 1704 GMT, 16 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1216, via World 
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News Connection) The immediate response by the Russian government was yet 
another postponement of Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov's trip to Japan until 
sometime in February. This delay suggests that the new Russian leadership, like 
the old one, will place Russo-Japanese relations behind other, more pressing 
international relations with Western Europe, the Middle East and China. The 
news of the postponement came shortly after Ivanov told European countries that 
Russia would "devote much of its attention to Asian countries." (RFE/RL 
NEWSLINE, 18 Dec 99) So far, Russian attention to Japan has only taken the 
form of loan requests, resulting in a new $100 million loan granted on 29 
December. (INTERFAX, 1220 GMT, 29 Dec 99; FBIS-EAS-1999-1229, via World 
News Connection)  
 
Is Muslim criticism of Chechnya fading? 
As Russia's campaign against Muslim Chechnya rages on and Russia 
implements new, harsher "security measures" aimed at Chechen males, Iranian 
National Security Council Secretary Husan Ruhani was dispatched to Moscow to 
discuss Iranian concerns. With no end of the war in sight, the Muslim world -- 
currently being represented by Iran, which leads the Organization of the Islamic 
Conference (OIC) -- has again submitted its request that Russia find a quick, 
political end to the Chechen conflict. (INTERFAX, 11 Jan 00; via lexis-nexis) This 
request, first voiced in December by Iranian Foreign Minister Kamal Khazzari, 
only persuaded the Russian government to accept OIC humanitarian assistance.  
 
The outcome of the latest meeting in Moscow suggests that, despite Moscow's 
dubious aims in Chechnya, Iran is not willing to criticize substantively Russia's 
operation just yet. Iranian concerns, it seems, are predictably focused on 
finalizing current arms sales and energy cooperation deals. The Iranian press, 
however, not only has questioned Russia's real intentions in the Caucasus, but 
also has pointed out the strain that Russia's "imperialist" and "expansionist" 
policies will have on its multipolar policy. (KAYHAN, 21 Dec 99; FBIS-NES-1999-
1221, via World News Connection) 
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Russian Federation: Domestic Issues and Legislative 
Branch 
By Michael Thurman 
 
FEDERAL ASSEMBLY 
Communists come in first, Unity second 
There are 450 seats in the Duma, half of which are selected by proportional 
representation by national party lists, and half are selected by first-past-the-post 
single-member districts. Six parties overcame the minimum five percent hurdle 
needed to enter the Duma on party lists. Results are as follows: 
 
1. Communist Party of the Russian Federation, 24.29 percent, received 67 seats 
2. Unity Interregional Movement (Medved), 23.32 percent, received 64 seats 
3. Fatherland-All Russia, 13.33 percent, received 37 seats 
4. Union of Right Wing Forces, 8.52 percent, received 24 seats 
5. Zhirinovsky Bloc, 5.98 percent, received 17 seats 
6. YABLOKO, 5.93 percent, received 16 seats 
(ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 31 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-2000-0104, via World News 
Connection) 
 
Presently, nine single-member district seats remain open, eight through the 
invalidation of each district's particular election results, and one seat for 
Chechnya which will remain vacant for the time being. A Duma by-election was 
originally suggested for 19 March, but that was before President Yel'tsin resigned 
and the date for the presidential elections moved to 26 March. Discussion is still 
underway as to whether to combine both the presidential and Duma by-elections. 
CEC Chairman Aleksandr Veshnyakov has come out in opposition to the idea, 
but his reasons are unclear. 
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The two surprises were the strong showing by Yel'tsin/Putin's electoral bloc 
Unity, and the poor showing of Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov and former Prime 
Minister Yevgeny Primakov's electoral alliance Fatherland-All Russia. 
 
Thirteen members of election lists blocs decline to enter the Third Duma 
Not for the first time, some members of elected blocs have refused the honor. 
After the 1995 Duma elections, then-Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin, movie 
director Nikita Mikhalkov, and General Lev Rokhlin -- the three leaders of Our 
Home is Russia -- refused to take their Duma seats. 
 
While not widely known, current election law states that if only one of the top 
three names on a federal party list refuses to sit in the Duma after an election, 
the entire party is prevented from sitting, unless the refusal is based on the party 
member's wish to retain another official position or he/she is in poor health. 
 
In the wake of the Third Duma election, 13 persons have refused to take their 
seats. These include: Sergei Shoigu, head of Unity, who wishes to remain 
emergency situations minister; seven members of Fatherland-All Russia, 
including two of its three leaders, Moscow Mayor Yuri Luzhkov, and St. 
Petersburg Governor Vladimir Yakovlev; the Zhirinovsky Bloc's Stanislav 
Zhebrovsky; and four members of the Communist Party -- including the 
governors of the Tula and Kemerovo regions, Vasily Starodubtsev and Aman 
Tuleev. However, there has been no indication that any of these parties will be 
prevented from sitting as a result of these decisions. 
 
Former Prime Minister Yevgeny Primakov, the other Fatherland-All Russia 
leader, has decided to take his Duma seat, as has former Duma speaker 
Gennady Seleznov, a Communist who lost a narrow race for governor of the 
Moscow region. (THE MOSCOW TIMES, 11 Jan 00; via www.moscowtimes.ru) 
 
 13 
Single-member district MPs form group in Duma 
It seems that the country's regions are well represented in Moscow, what with the 
Federation Council (whose members are either the governors or leaders of 
parliament from the country's 89 regions) and All Russia's rumored split with 
Fatherland in the Duma. (ITAR-TASS , 1834 GMT, 23 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
1223, via World News Connection) Before its electoral alliance with Fatherland, 
All Russia was a regional association and may revert to one again. 
 
Now, Duma deputy Gennady Raikov says that around 50 Duma deputies chosen 
by single-member districts have voiced interest in organizing a group to defend 
the interests of the regions. Maybe they should think about defending their own 
interests in the Duma. (ITAR-TASS, 0932 GMT, 5 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0105, 
via World News Connection) 
 
The potential importance of district deputies in the Duma, as opposed to party 
deputies, is not often discussed. The Russian Duma is chosen in two ways, and 
the institutional loyalty of its 450 members may be similarly bifurcated. Party list 
members who sit in the Duma at the pleasure of their respective parties may owe 
their allegiance to that party, much as European parliamentary systems operate. 
Deputies who won their seats in single-member districts, as happens in the 
United States, might have different motivating factors. 
 
If these prior assumptions are true, and much more research is required to know 
for sure, there should be more evidence of party jumping and cross-party voting 
for district deputies. As their power base is in the home district, it might be 
expected that their conduct is more fluid because they seek to please the voters 
at home. Party deputies, conversely, might be expected to evince greater party 
discipline in voting, and be less likely to change party affiliation. An interesting 
possibility would be that district deputies may wield more influence than their 
individual numbers may warrant. During periods of coalition building for particular 
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articles of legislation, for example, Duma faction leaders may reach out to swing 
district deputies, who may demand certain policy changes for their support. 
 
All of this is speculation and needs further study. The ability of parties to control 
their members, the personal avarice of district deputies, or perhaps a kleptocratic 
parliamentary culture may negate the assumptions made above. Whatever the 
result, it is clearly true that if the Duma is to be better understood, analysts must 
look not only at party numbers, but also at the relationship between district and 
party deputies. 
 
REGIONS 
Finally, Vladivostok adopts a city charter 
The last city to do so, Vladivostok finally has a democratically elected city 
charter. This means that for the first time a mayor can be elected, a city council 
chosen, and pressing municipal issues addressed. In the past there have been 
serious disagreements between city and regional authorities, with the latter 
usually ending up the victor. The city has often been run directly by the regional 
government. Now, the relationship between the two levels of authority can be 
clarified and, one hopes, the city's notorious reputation for lawlessness can be 
reigned in somewhat. (ITAR-TASS, 0730 GMT 23 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-
1223, via World News Connection) 
 
 
Russian Federation: Armed Forces 
By LCDR James Duke Jr. And Lt. Col. Jill Skelton 
 
Nikitin acquitted 
Aleksandr Nikitin, the former Russian naval officer turned environmentalist, was 
acquitted of high treason charges 29 December by a St. Petersburg military 
tribunal. (AFP, 1511 GMT, 29 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1229, via World News 
Connection) Judge Sergei Golets' unexpected verdict shocked Nikitin, his 
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defense counsel, and the prosecution. The verdict is a significant victory for 
Nikitin. Since his February 1996 arrest, he has endured a four-year struggle 
against an unrelenting opponent: the notorious Federal Security Service (FSB). 
The FSB faced its first setback in the Fall of 1998, when Judge Golets stopped 
Nikitin's first trial partway and ordered a "re-investigation," a relic from the Soviet 
era when judges avoided acquitting an obviously innocent person. (THE NIS 
OBSERVED, 17 Sep 99, 7 Oct 98) In his stunning 29 December verdict, Judge 
Golets ruled that the Russian constitution forbids charges based on secret or 
retroactively applied law, and provisions of the constitution which forbid declaring 
environmental hazards "secret" also applied to nuclear submarines. Nikitin's legal 
victory last month was a complete rebuke of the FSB's entire case. (THE 
OTTAWA CITIZEN, 30 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) 
 
Nikitin's acquittal is even more amazing given the nationalistic, anti-Western 
sentiment fanned by former FSB head, prime minister and now acting President 
Vladimir Putin. Following his appointment as FSB director in August 1998, Putin 
oversaw an organization which retained its KGB-style secretive and bullying 
tactics. (THE ECONOMIST, 8 Jan 2000; via lexis-nexis) After promoting anti-
Western hostility during the NATO bombing campaign in Kosovo, the FSB 
mounted a campaign to vilify Nikitin, making the ridiculous assertion that Nikitin 
emboldened the West and started the war. (THE OTTAWA CITIZEN, 30 Dec 99; 
via lexis-nexis) There is little reason to believe Putin will champion civil liberties in 
the near future.  
 
Despite the victory, Nikitin's ordeal is not over yet. The prosecution has ordered 
an appeal to the Supreme Court. In addition, Nikitin may face administrative 
harassment if he tries to leave Russia and visit his wife and daughter, who now 
live in Canada. Finally, little has been done to dismantle safely Russia's rusting 
fleet of nuclear submarines. Optimists hope Nikitin's legal victory will help move 
Russia towards a country ruled by law instead of raw power. However, Putin's 
vision of a strong state does not presage an equally strong judicial system. 
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Russia becoming blind to ballistic missiles 
Russia's early warning system is so decrepit that it can no longer detect 
intercontinental ballistic missiles at least seven hours a day and is completely 
blind to submarine-launched missiles. Russia's problems are due to the Kremlin's 
inability to finance replacement of aging satellites designed to detect ballistic 
missile launches. Analysts believe only 4 of 21 early warning satellites are 
working. This is as much a problem for the United States as it is for Russia. 
Russia's newly promulgated national security doctrine expands the first-strike 
role for nuclear weapons. In addition, the logic of nuclear deterrence requires 
both sides to launch their missiles before a surprise attack obliterates them. In 
the heat of a crisis, analysts fear Russia may misread a nonthreatening rocket 
launch or unambiguous data as a nuclear first strike and launch a salvo at the US 
and Western Europe. (OMAHA WORLD HERALD, 10 Jan 00)  
 
US-initiated efforts to prevent such an incident have met with limited success. 
After repeated US prodding, Russia agreed to allow US and Russian officers to 
sit together over New Year's Eve at the ad hoc Center for Y2K Strategic Stability 
at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado Springs, CO, monitoring for any false 
indications of attack caused by the Y2K computer bug. Russia retreated from an 
earlier proposal to allow US officers into Moscow's early warning centers, and 
subsequent reports indicate the Russian defense ministry has no desire to 
participate in a permanent joint early warning center. (The Jamestown 
Foundation MONITOR, 6 Jan 00) Russia's refusal to discuss any US-led 
solutions to this problem gives more justification for the US to build a National 
Missile Defense system to guard against an accidental or unauthorized 
intercontinental ballistic missile launch from Russia. 
 
Exports maintain Russian arms industry on life support 
On the eve of 2000, China's navy formally accepted the first of two Russian-built 
Soveremenny-class destroyers. The ship, with its new Chinese crew, was visiting 
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the Baltic port of Baltiisk before departing for China. (ITAR-TASS, 1115 GMT, 5 
Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0105, via World News Connection) China bought the 
two ships for the bargain price of $800 million. In comparison, one US Arleigh 
Burke-class destroyer costs about $900 million. The ships' most formidable 
weapon is the supersonic Moskit antiship cruise missile, also known in the West 
as the SS-N-22 "Sunburn." Russia is scheduled to deliver the missiles to China 
by late 2000, the first foreign sale of this type of missile. Beijing has also 
purchased from Russia four Kilo-class diesel-electric submarines. 
 
In the absence of robust Russian weapons procurement, the export market has 
kept Russia's arms industry on life support. In 1999 Russia expects a $3 billion 
dollar profit from arms exports. Of the $3 billion, $1 billion is attributed to Chinese 
purchases. (MEGAPOLIS-KONTINENT, Dec 99; Agency WPS, via lexis-nexis) 
The exports have helped to offset Russia's feeble defense procurement over the 
past eight years. For example, in 1990 the Soviet Union bought 1,600 main battle 
tanks, 500 self-propelled artillery pieces, and 430 tactical aircraft. However, in 
1998 Russia bought only 15 main battle tanks, 10 self-propelled artillery pieces, 
40 tactical aircraft. China, India, and Iran are Russia's biggest customers. The 
ruble's 1998 devaluation also sparked sales to less affluent buyers, particularly 
those in conflict-prone regions of Africa. (The International Institute for Strategic 
Studies, STRATEGIC BALANCE 1999/2000, Oct 99) The Duma has also 
legislated new laws to prevent bankruptcies and privatization of the Russian 
military-industrial complex's flagship organizations, a move many experts believe 
is intended to strengthen the state's grip of this key industry. (DEFENSE NEWS, 
20 Dec 99) Acting President Putin's signature on the legislation would halt any 
privatization of Russia's military-industrial complex. 
 
Russian navy seeks respect 
In an effort to remake its image from a bygone naval power, Admiral Victor 
Kravchenko, head of the Russian navy's main staff, intends to deploy ships to "all 
important waters, including the Mediterranean Sea." (RIA NEWS AGENCY, 1425 
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GMT, 17 Dec 99; BBC, via lexis-nexis) This plan supports acting President 
Vladimir Putin's policy advocating a strong military. The government is expected 
to fund deployment to the Mediterranean of Russia's only aircraft carrier, the 
Admiral Kuznetsov, along with a destroyer, frigate, and tanker. Forward bases in 
Cam Ranh Bay, Vietnam and Tartus, Syria may also receive repair funds. 
(JANE'S DEFENSE WEEKLY, 1 Dec 99) Given the infirm state of Russia's navy, 
a Mediterranean deployment would be a departure from recent operating 
patterns. Except for isolated cases, Russia's naval fleets have confined 
themselves to their home waters. Other than showing the flag, the planned 
deployment will probably be of little strategic significance to the region. 
 
Senior commanders replaced 
It was announced on 7 January that the two senior field commanders in 
Chechnya, Lt Gen Gennady Troshev and Maj Gen Vladimir Shamanov, were to 
be replaced by their deputies, General Sergei Markarov and General Aleksei 
Verbitsky. (The Jamestown Foundation MONITOR, 10 Jan 00) The two general 
officers were the commanders of the eastern and western federal groupings in 
Chechnya, respectively. Sources in the defense ministry were quick to assure the 
Russian public that the generals were not being "fired" but were merely being 
rotated to allow other commanders to gain combat experience. Acting President 
Putin reaffirmed this, stating that "Russia does not cast aside such generals." To 
support this explanation a group of senior officers from the Russian General Staff 
and from remote military districts were to arrive in the Chechen combat zone in 
the near future for the purpose of gaining on-site exposure to combat operations. 
Military spokesmen say that, to date, more than 20 generals have gained 
practical combat experience during combat operations in Chechnya. (INTERFAX, 
1724 GMT, 7 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0107; and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 10 
Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0110, via World News Connection) 
 
Generals Troshev and Shamanov will return to their former duties. Maj Gen 
Shamanov was commander of the 58th Army of the North Caucasian Military 
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District and Lt Gen Troshev was deputy commander of the North Caucasian 
Military District.  
 
Despite these reassurances, the removal of the two senior field commanders in 
Chechnya at this particular point in time is odd and should raise eyebrows. Their 
replacement comes at a time when combat operations are stalling -- the siege of 
Dzhokhar has lasted for several weeks despite repetitive official announcements 
that Chechen operations are going well. Combat soldiers are becoming more 
vocal in their dissatisfaction with command decisions and the media have begun 
to report more openly on the dire conditions and increasing casualty numbers of 
the Russian forces. It should also be remembered that it was Shamanov who, 
back in October 99, threatened possible "civil war" if Russian officials halted 
military operations in Chechnya. At the time, few doubted the general had 
sufficient support to back his threat. 
 
It is likely that these officers have come to represent liabilities, particularly to 
acting President Putin, whose popularity going into the March 2000 presidential 
elections is said to depend so heavily on success in Chechnya. Either they have 
proven unwilling or unable to take on the next, more aggressive steps required to 
break the deadlock in Chechnya and/or they represent potential roadblocks 
should Russian officials decide to approach diplomatic/political resolutions in the 
near future. Either way they are out and the road is now open to resolve the 
Chechen issue before negative press can begin to harm Putin's popularity. 
 
Now the gloves come off 
No sooner had Lt Gen Troshev and Maj Gen Shamanov been replaced then the 
heat was turned up on Chechen operations. Chechen militant forces began 
aggressive, significant offensives against several Russian-held areas. The cities 
of Argun, Gudermes and Shali came under surprise attack by Chechen forces, 
with serious Russian casualties reported. Russian defense forces blamed interior 
troops, saying they did not appropriately secure the Russian-held cities. Chechen 
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forces also were holding their positions despite reported heavy fighting in the city 
of Vedeno, the largest remaining town still in Chechen hands. Looking across the 
spectrum of Chechen operations it is clear, as of last week, that Russian 
operations in Chechnya were in trouble. Defense Minister Igor Sergeev 
confirmed this when he stated publicly that "the situation in Chechnya has 
seriously changed of late. An enlargement of the safe zones requires a new style 
and method of command." General Viktor Kazantsev, military commander for the 
Caucasus, blamed the setback on Russian forces being too "tenderhearted." 
(THE ECONOMIST (UK), 15-21 Jan 00; via Johnson's Russia List, and THE 
WASHINGTON POST, 14 Jan 00) 
 
The Russian answer has been a harsh crackdown on the Chechen population 
and a restart of aggressive military operations. On 11 January it was announced 
that all Chechen males between 10 and 60 would be detained and interrogated 
to insure they were not "fighters." Also, Chechen males were no longer allowed 
to exit Chechnya as refugees. This action has raised the specter of the "filtration" 
camps established by the Russians during the previous Chechen war. Individuals 
in these camps reportedly were subject to lengthy detention, frequent torture, and 
in some cases summary execution. The Russian information campaign is also in 
full swing, with reports that sites have been discovered in Urus-Martan housing 
the identical bomb materials used in this summer's terrorist bombings in Russia. 
In addition, the Russian general prosecutor's office is reporting the discovery of 
mass graves in the "liberated" areas of Chechnya. These gravesites supposedly 
contain the bodies of Russian-speaking civilians killed by former Chechen 
authorities. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 6 Jan 00, and ROSSIYSKAYA GAZETA, 6 Jan 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0106, via World News Connection) What better news 
releases to feed the flames of smoldering Russian public outrage! 
 
Interior forces are being replaced or reinforced in Russian-controlled areas with 
front-line defense forces -- soldiers and armor. It is expected there will be a major 
offensive by Russian forces, following a supposed holiday cease-fire, against 
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Dzhokhar in an attempt to seize the city once and for all. It also appears that 
Russians are stepping up their operations in the southern mountains, particularly 
the Argun Gorge, to secure the border with Georgia, take Chechen strongholds 
and cut supply routes. Russia is dropping in its most combat- ready forces to 
seize key checkpoints and there are reports that Russian forces are using "high-
yield" munitions to blow the Chechens out of the mountains and caves where 
they have constructed very effective defenses. (INTERFAX, 1022 GMT, 11 Jan 
00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0111, via World News Connection) 
 
The prognosis for Russian operations in Chechnya is no end in sight for the 
foreseeable future if Russia continues its objective to wipe out all militants. The 
war is solidifying into the much-expected protracted and costly guerrilla war. That 
the Russians will eventually take Dzhokhar is a given. That the Chechen militants 
will become increasingly overwhelmed as their finite numbers in manpower and 
munitions continue to drop in the war of attrition is also expected. The wild card is 
acting President Putin. How far will he allow the protracted, costly and messy 
operations to continue in the face of increasing negative press? What is an 
imaginable end-state given the verbalized Russian objectives and the lack of an 
identifiable Chechen governing structure? 
 
 
Newly Independent States: CIS 
By Sarah Miller 
 
What will a new, stronger Russian leadership mean for the frail CIS? 
What changes will a new year and a new Russian acting president bring to the 
old difficulties that plague the CIS? On 25 January, the CIS Heads of State will 
convene in Moscow for the first time since April 1999 to discuss bilateral and 
multilateral difficulties -- both old and new -- in the CIS. (ITAR-TASS, 1235 GMT, 
7 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0107, via lexis-nexis) The upcoming meeting will be 
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an important indicator of how CIS relations will progress under the new Russian 
leadership. For the time being, all signals point to more of the same.  
 
1 January 2000 came and went in the CIS but the Free Trade Zone (FTZ) 
remains an unresolved issue. The FTZ was slated to begin formally on 1 
January, but it was not implemented. Since last spring, the issue has been at an 
impasse since some member states fear that the current FTZ treaty language 
either abrogates their current WTO status or jeopardizes future WTO status. The 
issue at hand isn't whether the FTZ is advisable, but what standards should 
apply, and Russia isn't budging. In the past, the FTZ issue has been a summit-
breaker, perpetuating bad feelings between the pro-Russian clique in the CIS 
and those who support WTO standards. (THE NIS OBSERVED, 23 Jun 99) 
 
With the meeting just days away, it is unclear if Georgia, a new WTO member, 
will attend the summit at which the FTZ will be discussed. If Georgian President 
Eduard Shevardnadze does decide to attend, he will be forced to introduce 
further changes to the FTZ document or risk his country's new WTO 
membership. Kyrgyzstan is in a similar situation. Thus, the outcome of this 
summit's FTZ debate will provide an indication of how economic relations will 
shape up in the months to come. For now, the sides seem poised for another 
indecisive debate pitting Russia against Georgia.  
 
The FTZ struggle is only complicated by Russia's operation in Chechnya and 
acting President Vladimir Putin's imposition of a "temporary" visa regime with CIS 
states. In Putin's recent statements on the CIS -- made while he was still prime 
minister -- he said that only a strong Russia could be attractive to commonwealth 
members and that cooperation was good only if it was in accordance with 
Russia's interests. (IZVESTIA, 17 Dec 99; via lexis-nexis) Putin's comments 
seem to demonstrate his desire to strengthen Russian leadership within the 
commonwealth. Clearly, Putin has an interest in bolstering Russia's strength and 
pursuing Russia's interests in the months leading up to the Russian presidential 
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elections on 26 March. And although these statements were made prior to his 
appointment as acting president, they still don't bode well for the upcoming 
summit, only two months prior to the election. For the CIS in 2000, the question 
is how much a stronger Russian leadership will serve to rattle the already fragile 
CIS structure. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Western Region 
By Tammy Lynch 
 
UKRAINE 
Lights, camera, referendum! 
President Leonid Kuchma has done what he has been threatening to do since his 
re-election. On 15 January, Kuchma called an All-Ukraine referendum asking 
voters for permission to dissolve the parliament, change its format from 
unicameral to bicameral, limit the immunity of deputies, and cut the number of 
deputies from 450 to 300. There seems to be only one major problem with the 
questions being asked of the people by Kuchma: According to the country's 
constitution, they can't be decided by referendum. Therefore, unless Ukraine is 
planning to follow Russia's lead and contort the constitution to fit the whims of the 
presidential administration, all decisions made by voters in this referendum will 
be legally moot. They will not, however, be politically moot, and that, perhaps, is 
the point. Currently in Ukraine, there is no question that Kuchma is riding high, 
while the parliament is struggling simply to stay above water. The result has been 
Kuchma's ability to introduce more reforms in the two months since his election 
than he did in the previous several years. 
 
Perhaps Kuchma's reelection has energized him and his administration. Perhaps 
the country has finally hit the proverbial "rock bottom," and is now beginning to 
realize what must be done to climb out of the situation. Perhaps the influx of new, 
professional ministers is providing a needed boost to the cabinet. Or, perhaps 
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there is simply no choice left. Regardless of the reason, Ukraine appears to be 
tackling its problems with previously unseen speed and candor. Its energy 
situation is the best example. 
 
After months of denial, Ukraine last week announced that Russia's accusations 
against it were true: The Ukrainian gas company Naftogaz has indeed been 
siphoning off gas as it is piped through Ukraine on its way from Russia to Turkey. 
"Naftogaz Ukrayiny is taking about 130 million cubic meters of gas a day and that 
is not anticipated by existing contracts," Yulia Timoshenko, the new deputy prime 
minister for the energy industries, said. "This means that our debt for gas is 
growing about $10 million a day." (BLOOMBERG, 0118 EST, 13 Jan 00; via 
America Online) Timoshenko also suggested that Ukraine's debt to Russia for 
gas received under previous contracts is well over $2 billion. Previously, the 
government had admitted only one-half of that debt. 
 
At the same time, Timoshenko announced a three-month state of emergency in 
the energy sector, in order to speed implementation of a new reform program 
called "Clean Energy." The program is intended to decrease the use of domestic 
barter to pay for gas, improve management, and cut down on both "corruption 
and theft" which, according to Timoshenko, "are flourishing." She told reporters 
that law-enforcement agencies have recently found almost 500 "large-scale" 
crimes in the energy sector, but gave no further details. (ITAR-TASS, 12 Jan 00; 
via lexis-nexis, and DEUTSCHE PRESSE-AGENTUR, 1615 CET, 12 Jan 00; via 
lexis-nexis) There are signals, however, that the reform program may include the 
government taking back several energy companies privatized under questionable 
circumstances years ago.  
 
It should be noted that Timoshenko is very likely using this situation to attack her 
former rival, Ihor Bakay, the head of Naftogaz Ukrayiny. Timoshenko spent years 
heading another gas company, Unified Energy Systems, which was favored over 
Naftogaz under the previous parliament head, Pavel Lazarenko. She was 
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dismissed from her position by Kuchma in 1998, as Naftogaz then became the 
favored corporation. (RFE/RL POLAND, BELARUS, AND UKRAINE REPORT, 
18 Jan 00) Regardless of the motive, however, Timoshenko's statements at least 
represent some desperately needed movement on the issue. In addition, given 
the absence of his response to them, they seem to be supported by Kuchma. 
 
As Timoshenko was developing her agenda for dealing with the energy crisis, 
President Kuchma was continuing to issue decrees in rapid succession. Last 
month, he decreed that the agricultural sector would be reformed, and appointed 
a new, more experienced minister of agriculture. The reform plan centers on the 
privatization of many of the country's collective farms by mid-2000. Kuchma then 
announced that the speed of state property privatization would be increased. 
According to Kuchma, as many as 2,200 properties will be privatized this year, 
compared to 435 in 1999, generating revenues of $500 million by the end of the 
year. (INTERFAX, 1707 GMT, 29 Dec 99; FBIS-SOV-1999-1229, via World 
News Connection)  
 
The rejuvenated president then created an anti-corruption/anti-mafia committee 
led by Prosecutor General Mikhail Potebenko, and decreed changes in tax and 
custom laws, in order to answer some of the concerns of the IMF. Finally, he 
found the time to encourage his supporters to gather signatures to register the 
aforementioned referendum. Within just a few weeks, his minions had fanned out 
throughout Ukraine's regions, quickly obtaining the necessary 3 million 
signatures.  
 
All of this presidential action has left the parliament -- which succeeded in 
blocking many presidential reforms last year -- seemingly helpless. For one 
shining moment, it even seemed that Kuchma had succeeded in creating the 
unimaginable -- a pro-presidential parliamentary majority. On 13 January, a 
group of deputies announced that they had created an 11-faction alliance. "We 
the people's deputies...recognizing our responsibility to voters for the current 
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situation in society..., announce the formation of a parliamentary majority," the 
coalition announced. (REUTERS, 1537 GMT, 13 Jan 00; via America Online)  
 
Unfortunately, the coalition, which did not include the majority Communist Party, 
quickly proved unable to complete its most important pro-presidential task. On 
the same day that the coalition was announced, Kuchma's budget for 2000 was 
rejected by the legislature. Deputies sharply objected to cuts in funding for 
regional administrations. (REUTERS, 0947 GMT, 13 Jan 00; via America Online) 
This is the second rejection of the proposed 2000 budget; the first came in 
November of 1999. It further delays resumption of the IMF and World Bank 
lending packages, and presumably stalls at least some of the newly announced 
reforms. 
 
The rejection no doubt guaranteed that Kuchma would announce his referendum. 
As the country faces debt default and energy and grain shortages, the 
parliament's inaction simply gave the president no choice.  
 
But what will Kuchma achieve by this announcement? Perhaps, passage of his 
budget. Or perhaps, his coronation. President Kuchma may simply be using this 
referendum as a bargaining chip, as in the past when he threatened to hold 
similar referenda. Or, Kuchma may believe that he will never be politically 
stronger, and now is the time to slay his parliamentary dragon. Whether it is 
legally binding, this referendum campaign will be bloody for those in parliament, 
and takes place halfway through their current terms as many are preparing for 
their next election. Conversely, it promises to be a gentle battle for Kuchma, after 
a difficult presidential election. Either way, it will be painful for the voters, and a 
major disruption to the political process.  
 
So, does Kuchma want to be king, or does he just need a budget? No doubt, the 
members of parliament are asking themselves the same thing today.  
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BELARUS 
Presenting: Alyaksandr and the Treaty, Chapter 1432 
Welcome, gentle readers. Although you undoubtedly thought you had read one 
of the final chapters in our ongoing saga, you were wrong. So, let us continue the 
Tale of the Treaty. It isn't pretty. But it almost was.  
 
Alyaksandr and Boris signed the outline, then they signed the outline again and 
called it a "treaty." Everyone was happy -- until Boris got his immunity and 
decided to spend his time taking the cure and getting some sun. "I've lost a very 
strong politician..., the politician I could always count on, who always supported 
me and the Belarusian people," lamented Alyaksandr. (ITAR-TASS, 0005 GMT, 
6 Jan 00; FBIS-SOV-2000-0106, via World News Connection)  
 
Now, the "treaty" has been ratified, but nobody cares, and Alyaksandr is lonely. 
He's waiting for Vladimir. He's apparently going to have a long wait. "Everything 
that was agreed with Yeltsin has been frozen," said parliamentary deputy Valery 
Drako. He was unable to provide details on what "was agreed" in the first place. 
(REUTERS, 1312 GMT, 13 Jan 00; via America Online) 
 
So, Alyaksandr sits, and sits, and sits. And waits, and waits, and waits. There is, 
after all, no government to run; it's in shambles. There are no statements from his 
opponents to answer; they're all in jail, hiding or "missing." There is no wife to talk 
to; she's not allowed to disturb him in Minsk. There is no time, you see. 
Alyaksandr is waiting. Alyaksandr is waiting for Vladimir... 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Caucasus 
By Miriam Lanskoy 
 
CHECHNYA 
How did the war start? 
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Many have questioned the validity of the official story -- that Russia attacked 
Chechnya to protect itself against the bandits and terrorists who staged raids into 
Dagestan and set explosions in Moscow. However, over the last three weeks 
some specific evidence pointing towards a very different scenario has emerged. 
 
In a 14 January interview with Nezavisimaya gazeta, former Prime Minister 
Sergei Stepashin related the origins of the present conflict: 
 
"In regard to Chechnya, I can say the following. Plans for active measures in this 
republic were developed starting in March. And we planned to approach the 
Terek in August-September. So this would have happened even in the absence 
of explosions in Moscow. I worked actively to bolster the borders with Chechnya, 
and prepared for an active offensive. So, in this regard, Vladimir Putin did not 
invent anything new. You can ask him about this. At the time he was the director 
of the FSB and had all the information at his disposal. I always supported forceful 
and cruel policies (sil'noi I zhestokoi politike) in Chechnya. But I would think 
carefully before crossing the Terek and going further south." 
 
It would seem from the above that the decision to wage war against Chechnya 
was made in March 1999 or earlier. Were the August 1999 raid in Dagestan and 
the bombings in Russian cities coincidences that the Kremlin exploited? Or were 
they orchestrated by Russian security services to provide a pretext for the brutal 
campaign against Chechnya?  
 
Two articles by Helen Womak in The Independent point to the latter possibility. 
On 6 January she published an article based on the film footage brought out of 
Dzhokhar in December. In the film, a Military Intelligence (GRU) officer, Alexei 
Galtin, says: " I did not take apart in the explosions of the buildings in Moscow 
and Dagestan but I have information about it. I know who is responsible for the 
bombings in Moscow (and Dagestan). It is the FSB (Russian Security Service), in 
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cooperation with the GRU, that is responsible for the explosions in Volgodonsk 
and Moscow."  
 
The second story published on 9 January suggests that Basaev was lured into 
Dagestan. He was given disinformation to suggest that the Dagestanis would 
revolt if he staged an outing to the region. A member of Putin's "Medved" party, 
Grigory Amnouel, told Womak that "They thought it would be easy but it was a 
trap."  
 
Putin's 21 January statement, that "The danger of terrorist acts in Russia is 
growing," must be seen in this context. (UPI, 21 Jan 00; via chechnya-sl-
@egroups.com) As the Russian offensive stalls and the casualties mount, the 
FSB and GRU may again resort to bombings to bolster lagging public 
enthusiasm for the war effort. 
 
How will it end? 
It has been observed frequently that acting President Vladimir Putin's popularity 
depends on his management of the war in Chechnya. Now that even the official 
information channels must admit that Russian troops are sustaining very heavy 
casualties and still failing to secure key Chechen cities, will the perception of the 
war and Putin change drastically? And how would that affect the presidential 
elections scheduled for 26 March ? 
 
Putin is under a great deal of pressure to wind up the hostilities quickly. The war 
helped his party in the Duma elections, but by March the electorate may want 
peace, particularly if the Chechen counteroffensive holds. That means 
negotiating a face-saving agreement with President Aslan Maskhadov, a solution 
Putin has avoided steadfastly, or intensifying the war effort by inflicting ever more 
deadly policies and weapons on the Chechen population.  
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Recent Chechen gains have severely undermined Russian morale, prompting a 
reshuffling of the military command, a temporary halt in the operations against 
Dzhokhar and new pessimism in the Russian press.  
 
On 12 January, for the first time since the start of the war, a major Russian 
paper, Nezavisimaya gazeta, suggested that the present conflict may end in the 
same vein of ignominious failure as the last one. This paper is owned by Boris 
Berezovsky, who has fallen out with Putin and has called repeatedly for 
negotiations. However, the same pessimistic mood appeared in other Russian 
media as well. Whereas during the fall only Radio Liberty and Novaya gazeta 
(closely allied with the YABLOKO party) consistently championed the victims, 
now NTV, Obshchaya gazeta, Moskovsky komsomolets, and Segodnya have all 
registered their disapproval of the conduct of the war. (IWPR Caucasus 
Reporting Service, 15 Jan 00)  
 
The shift in reporting followed several weeks of serious setbacks for Russian 
forces. After months of shelling Dzhokhar and over three weeks of concerted 
assault against the city, the Russian command halted the effort temporarily in the 
face of formidable Chechen resistance. Presently the Russian forces are mired in 
precisely the kind of street-by-street fighting that cost them so dearly in the last 
war.  
 
The Chechen counteroffensive was launched after the Russian side refused 
President Aslan Maskhadov's offer of a three-day cease-fire on 8 January. The 
Chechen command then announced it was switching to guerrilla tactics. Indeed, 
small, highly mobile Chechen detachments operating behind Russian lines 
reopened the front in three cities that had fallen to the Russians weeks earlier: 
Shali, Gudermes, and Argun. Although the Russian side has claimed to have 
again captured those areas and the mountain village Vedeno, it is clear that this 
war is still far from over.  
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Not for the 'tender-hearted' 
These defeats prompted the Russian leadership to reappraise its tactics. After 
meeting with key military and security advisers, Putin approved a new set of 
measures on 12 January. The military had undergone careful analysis of the 
present situation, examined all the evidence and identified the mistakes 
committed in Chechnya: " They include tender-heartedness and frequent 
absolutely groundless trust" towards Chechen civilians, Colonel General Viktor 
Kazantsev told reporters. (THE GUARDIAN, 12 Jan 00; via Johnson's Russia 
List) To remedy this fault, all Chechen males between the ages of 10 and 60 are 
now systematically "interrogated" -- possibly in "filtration" camps.  
 
Such camps, created ostensibly to separate the fighters from the civilian 
refugees, operated during the last war. Then, apart from those detained on the 
border, Chechen males were rounded up from villages and towns that had fallen 
to the Russians. At this point, there is no telling how many are detained presently 
and whether this policy is being applied throughout the republic.  
 
In fact, we may discover that this war has been even more terrible than the most 
sensational reporting has portrayed it. For instance, there have been numerous 
unproved allegations about the use of chemical weapons in Dzhokhar. Similarly, 
Chechen sources made public a Russian Security Council memorandum 
adopting a deportation policy. As the election nears and the position of the 
Russian forces becomes more desperate, these and other gruesome practices 
may well be confirmed. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Central Asia 
By Monika Shepherd 
 
UZBEKISTAN 
Incumbent president receives 91.9% of vote, including that of his opponent 
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According to official results, on 9 January Islom Abdughanievich Karimov was 
handily reelected with 91.9% of the vote. Only 4.17% of eligible voters chose to 
cast their ballots in favor of the incumbent president's sole opponent in the race, 
Abdulhafiz Jalolov, a professor of Marxist philosophy. Prof. Jalolov was running 
as a candidate of the People's Democracy Party (President Karimov's previous 
party and also the Uzbek branch of the now defunct Communist Party of the 
Soviet Union), which is most notable for its staunch support of President Karimov 
and his policies. During the campaign, Prof. Jalolov publicly declared that he 
intended to vote for the incumbent president and that he had decided to register 
as a presidential candidate himself in order to give the elections a more 
democratic appearance. (TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER, 13 Jan 00) Uzbekistan's 
two main opposition parties, Erk (Free Will) and Birlik (Unity), were not permitted 
to participate in the 9 January elections and their leaders continue to live in exile.  
 
Approximately 100 foreign observers were present during the elections; however, 
the OSCE refused to send even a small observer mission to monitor the polls 
(RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 10 Jan 00) and the US State Department condemned the 
election process as "neither free nor fair." (TURKISTAN NEWSLETTER, 13 Jan 
00) In a radio interview, Erk Party Chairman Muhammad Solih also deemed the 
Uzbek presidential elections completely undemocratic and called Prof. Jalolov's 
candidacy a sham. (VOICE OF THE ISLAMIC REPUBLIC OF IRAN, 1500 GMT, 
11 Jan 00; FBIS-NES-2000-0111, via World News Connection) 
 
President Karimov's second term in office will last until 2005, when, according to 
Uzbekistan's constitution, he must stand down and permit his party to nominate a 
new candidate for the presidency. Many political analysts already may be 
questioning whether the current Uzbek president will allow anyone to replace him 
as the country's leader five years from now, since public questioning of his 
authority generally meets with harsh punishment. Open criticism of the Uzbek 
government or its policies is tolerated even less. In fact, it could be said that the 
degree of political repression in Uzbekistan today rivals that of Soviet times. A 
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few brief examples: In 1999 university department chairs were ordered to submit 
to the Uzbek Department of Higher Education lists of their faculty and staff in 
which they described each person's attitude toward national independence. 
University department chairpersons are now also required to pass examinations 
on President Karimov's written works in order to retain their positions. Doctoral 
candidates must pass a similar examination before receiving permission to 
defend their dissertations. No one is permitted to publish any written work until it 
has been approved by the state censors and discussion in the media of current 
government policy is virtually nonexistent; editors and news programmers prefer 
to focus on the accomplishments of officially approved Uzbek scholars and 
heroes from previous centuries. 
 
Thus far, there is no reason to assume that President Karimov will change his 
policies in favor of allowing a more open society to develop. His main goals for 
the next five years center around Uzbekistan's economy and have little to do with 
improving the country's political life. In the absence of even moderate political 
reforms, it is difficult to envision the development of a viable mechanism which 
would allow Uzbekistan's political leadership to change without a violent struggle 
for succession. In fact, it is not unlikely that over the course of the next five years, 
President Karimov will find a way to change the electoral laws set out by the 
constitution so that he may extend his reign for another five years, or perhaps 
even indefinitely. 
 
TURKMENISTAN 
With a show of reluctance, President Niyazov agrees to reign for life 
Turkmenistan's President Saparmyrat Niyazov (Turkmenbashi) rejected a 
proposal by the People's Council (parliament) on 27 December that he be 
appointed president for life and countered it with a bill of his own which bans 
smoking in all public places. The goal of this ban is to extend average life 
expectancy in Turkmenistan by ten years. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 28 Dec 99) 
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President Niyazov himself is no longer permitted to smoke, due to a recent heart 
operation.  
 
However, just one day later, the Turkmen president apparently experienced a 
change of heart and accepted the parliament's proposal that he continue to 
occupy the presidency for the rest of his life. Perhaps emboldened by his new job 
security, President Niyazov then informed the People's Council on 29 December 
that, for the next decade, Turkmenistan will be ruled by only one political party, 
his Democratic Party. (RFE/RL NEWSLINE, 30 Dec 99) 
 
Now it only remains for President Niyazov to abolish his country's constitution 
and openly proclaim rule by presidential decree, in order to realize fully his role 
as dictator for life. 
 
 
Newly Independent States: Baltic States 
By Kate Martin 
 
Difficulty in finding happy media in region 
Baltic area media experienced a bit of juggling in the past month, with job 
changes, dismissals, and outlet sales. 
 
The Estonian Broadcasting Council fired Toomas Lepp, the general director of 
the country's public television channel Eesti Televisioon (ETV), reportedly due to 
Lepp's inability to deal with ETV's persistent financial problems. The dismissal 
was not a complete surprise, since Lepp had overcome a lack of confidence by 
most members of the ETV board in June with the promise that he would carry out 
reforms within the workplace. Lepp told reporters the dismissal was illegal and he 
intends to protest the move. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 
GMT, 13 Dec 99) The council also announced that ETV must base its operations 
on an austerity budget beginning 1 January 2000; the channel faces a cut of 14-
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24 million kroons (approximately US$898,000-1,540,000). Hand in hand with the 
budget announcement came the people effect: 130 staff members were told to 
expect notice of dismissal, as program production is cut by one-third. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 GMT, 21 Dec 99) 
 
Latvian Independent Television (Latvijas Neatkariga Televizija, or LNT) acquired 
49 percent of shares in the Estonian television company TV1 in December, 
according to Andrejs Ekis, the director general of LNT. Ekis also announced that 
the Estonian television company had acquired the right to retransmit Russia's 
ORT television. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 GMT, 20 Dec 
99) 
 
Meanwhile, buyers of the news agency ETA received some holiday cheer from 
the Estonian government, which ruled that repayment of the firm's tax debt of 3.7 
million kroons (roughly US$237,000) could be staggered. Rose Marketing, which 
submitted the winning bid for the news agency last Fall, had undertaken to 
assume all the ETA's debts, liabilities and pending lawsuits. ETA ended the first 
three quarters of the year with a loss of over 8 million kroons. (BALTIC NEWS 
SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 GMT, 21 Dec 99) 
 
Also happily reporting was Lithuanian MP Rimantas Pleikys, a coordinator of the 
somewhat controversial Baltic Waves Radio, who voiced satisfaction with the first 
working days of the non-governmental radio station. "Our expectations have 
been totally justified," Pleikys said. "The broadcasts can be heard very well." The 
station, which began operations on 1 January, is broadcast over central and 
eastern Lithuania, as well as a large part of western Belarus. Pleikys reported 
that the radio station has heard from listeners in Minsk and neighboring districts. 
With support from West European foundations, the non-governmental Baltic 
Waves Radio airs a one-half hour program in Belarusian. Future plans include 
broadcasts from Radio Free Europe from Prague and a 10-minute news program 
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by Lithuanian national radio. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1100 
GMT, 5 Jan 00) 
 
Survey says... 
Several Baltic residents managed to have their voices heard, as pollsters went 
on a survey spree toward the end of the year. Sometimes, the results were 
surprising; at other times, answers could get downright unnerving. For example, 
nearly two-thirds of Estonian residents distrust the police so much they would 
prefer to take the law into their own hands, according to a Saar Poll taken 
between October 17 and November 1 among 1,020 Estonian residents. While 
the respondents who declared their belief that citizens should take some 
responsibility for keeping crime in check (26 percent) may be shouldering the 
burden of living in a civil society, a further 37 percent said they were ready to 
take their own initiative. Nearly one-third of the persons polled said they or their 
family members had been victims of crime within the past year. Of those who had 
turned to the police, an astounding 76 percent said the crime detection abilities of 
the police were poor. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 GMT, 13 
Dec 99) 
 
While many Estonians are ready to fight crime, they also appear ready to fight for 
their country. Persons concerned about integration of non-citizens can find some 
comfort in another Saar Poll, which revealed that nearly one-half of the country's 
non-Estonian-speaking population expressed a willingness to take up arms 
against a foreign invasion of Estonia. Eighteen percent of the poll's non-Estonian 
respondents replied they were ready to defend the country against an enemy, 
while 31 percent said they would probably do so. Of the Estonian speakers 
responding, 37 percent announced a readiness to take up arms, while 26 percent 
said they probably would fight. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1900 
GMT, 13 Dec 99) 
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For many Lithuanians, the crime is in the government, or at least in government 
actions. Over 70 percent of participants in a recent poll held by the Vilmorus 
company believe that the sale of Mazeikiai Oil to the US-based Williams 
International company was against the law. Of the 1,002 citizens polled, 71.4 
percent said they thought the transaction was illegal, 19.1 percent did not know, 
and only 6.8 percent believed the move was legal. A majority of persons 
responding, 55.9 percent, said they believed the ruling Conservatives had 
financial interest in the US company. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1900 GMT, 16 Dec 99) 
 
Take our money -- please 
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) followed the carrot-and-stick approach to 
fiscal happiness with each of the Baltic states. Offers of money (or the promise to 
offer money) invariably came with advice on straightening each government's 
fiscal house. Adalbert Knobl, the IMF's representative in Estonia, said that talks 
over the new economic policy memorandum being developed in Tallinn were 
concluding with a positive result for Estonia. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1700 GMT, 20 Dec 99) That almost-effusive report can only be 
explained by a surfeit of holiday punch. 
 
In Latvia, the IMF announced the establishment of a 16-month credit of 
approximately US$45 million, to support the government's 2000 economic 
program. The government has said it does not intend to use the stand-by credit, 
and will treat it as a precautionary reserve. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY 
REPORT, 1800 GMT, 11 Dec 99) Riga was less insistent on frugality with funds 
from the European Union's PHARE program. The EU granted 16.5 million euros 
for the implementation of three projects aimed at improving water treatment 
facilities, infrastructure support for improving water supply and sewer systems, 
and facilitating the pre-accession process by focusing on labor relations, the 
energy sector, and corruption. (BALTIC NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 
GMT, 22 Dec 99) 
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Lithuania also received some nice financial news, or at least the promise of good 
news. The IMF and World Bank pledged to extend approximately US$180 million 
in financial assistance if the country carries out reforms. The IMF, which is 
dangling the promise of an $80 million stand-by credit, expects Lithuania to trim 
its fiscal deficit and improve the outlook of the national and social insurance 
budgets. The World Bank wants the government to gain control over budget 
expenditures, carry out reforms in the energy and agricultural sectors and 
regarding pensions, and improve the private business environment. (BALTIC 
NEWS SERVICE DAILY REPORT, 1700 GMT, 13 Dec 99) 
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